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INDIA’S NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: TWO 
CASES THAT HAVE RESHAPED INDIAN LAW 
Milan Dalal* 
Abstract: As a nation of over one billion people and the world’s largest 
democracy, India is sometimes confronted with situations in which its 
democratic institutions clash. Under the Indian Constitution, legislation 
concerning land reform is placed in a special category designed to im-
munize it from judicial scrutiny. This scheme, known as the Ninth 
Schedule, has been abused by legislators seeking electoral benefit. Simul-
taneously, the country has been rocked by a series of public corruption 
scandals. As Parliament has sought to clean up its image by expelling dis-
graced members, its actions have been challenged as unconstitutional, 
leading to a constitutional showdown between the legislative and judicial 
branches. This Note analyzes two seminal decisions of the Indian Su-
preme Court, handed down in January 2007, which have the potential to 
transform Indian law by declaring the court the ultimate arbiter of the 
meaning of the Indian Constitution. 
Introduction 
 India is often hailed as the world’s largest democracy.1 At the 
core of that democracy is a thriving, independent judicial system that 
has been an important engine of social change and development.2 
Yet, despite possessing a well-developed system of law inherited from 
British colonial rule,3 for the first fifty years following independence 
                                                                                                                      
* Milan Dalal is the Executive Note Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 See, e.g., Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s 
Largest Democracy (2004) (discussing history of India and its democratic nature). 
2 Justices of the Indian Supreme Court are chosen on the basis of seniority and free of 
political considerations at the behest of the President with consultation from the Chief 
Justice. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President. 
3 See Cent. Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book: India, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html#Govt (last visited May 15, 2008) (noting 
India’s legal system is “based on English common law”); see also Rahul Mehrotra & Sha-
rada Dwivedi, The Bombay High Court: The Story of the Building—1978–2003, at 
15 (2004) (“[F]irst official British Court of Justice [of Bombay] was inaugurated . . . on 8 
August 1672.”). India has possessed an organized system of appellate review since at least 
1861, when British Parliament passed the India High Courts Act, allowing appeal from 
regional high courts to the Privy Council in London. Id. at 20. 
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from Britain, the nation’s supreme court vacillated in exerting the full 
checks on the legislative branch requisite in modern democracies.4 
Two recent cases involving the power of courts to review Parliament’s 
legislative and non-legislative functions—the Coelho 5 and Raja Ram 
Pal 6 cases—demonstrate the Indian Supreme Court is embarking on 
a new era of judicial review, asserting itself as a co-equal branch of 
government and a body dedicated to upholding principles of democ-
ratic government.7 
 Part I of this Note examines the background of India’s Constitu-
tion with respect to judicial review, the Ninth Schedule laws, the 1973 
ruling of the Indian Supreme Court on which type of laws could be 
challenged, political corruption, and the power of Parliament to expel 
members. Part II describes recent jurisprudence of the court, including 
detailed discussion of the Coelho and Raja Ram Pal cases. Part III cri-
tiques these cases in terms of their positive and negative implications. 
I. Background 
A. Background to Ninth Schedule Leading up to Coelho 
 India achieved independence from Great Britain in 1947.8 Shortly 
afterwards, India’s leaders crafted the Constitution of India (constitu-
tion), which came into effect on January 26, 1950.9 Authored by Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar, it is the longest written constitution in the world.10 As 
with most constitutions, all laws passed by the legislative branch must 
conform to its provisions.11 
                                                                                                                      
4 See, e.g., I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643 (India) (holding Par-
liament lacked power to amend fundamental rights in constitution without a constitu-
tional convention); His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala & 
another, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India) (overruling Golaknath). 
5 I.R. Coelho (Dead) By Lrs v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1 [here-
inafter Coelho]. 
6 Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Others, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184 (India) 
[hereinafter Raja Ram Pal]. 
7 See Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1; Raja Ram Pal, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184. 
8 Cambridge Illustrated History: British Empire 386 (P.J. Marshall ed., 2006). 
9 Manas: History and Politics, Constitution of India, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/ 
southasia/History/Independent/indep.html (last visited May 5, 2008). 
10 Soli J. Sorabjee, Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United 
States Constitution Abroad 97 (Louis Henkin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
11 See Supreme Court of India, Constitution of Supreme Court of India, http://supreme 
courtofindia.nic.in/new_s/constitution.htm (last visited May 5, 2008). 
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 Not long after the enactment of the constitution, Parliament 
found reason to amend it.12 India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, a self-described “democrat and socialist,”13 had campaigned for 
decades against British imperialism and, after independence, vowed to 
free India from the stranglehold of elites.14 Nehru was a staunch sup-
porter of nationalization and expropriation of land from the elite for 
redistribution to the poor.15 Yet, India’s new constitution had guaran-
teed a right of property to its citizens, and therefore Nehru’s grand 
plans for equitable redistribution of zamin (land) were soon confronted 
by the zamindars (landowners) in the courts.16 Early court rulings held 
the land reform laws “transgressed the fundamental right to property 
guaranteed by the constitution.”17 
 As a result, Prime Minister Nehru introduced the First Amendment 
to the constitution of India on May 29, 1951, creating a famous scheme 
known as the “Ninth Schedule.”18 The First Amendment created article 
31B,19 which described the Ninth Schedule and was inserted into part 
III of the constitution.20 Originally consisting of thirteen laws, the Ninth 
Schedule was narrowly crafted to immunize land reform laws from judi-
cial review.21 
                                                                                                                      
12 See A.G. Noorani, Ninth Schedule and the Supreme Court, Econ. & Pol. Wkly., March 3, 
2007, at 731. 




16 See Noorani, supra note 12, at 731. 
17 Venkatesh Nayak, The Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/const/the_basic_structure 
_of_the_indian_constitution.pdf. 
18 See Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; Noorani, supra note 12, at 731. 
19 Article 31B reads: “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained 
in Article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any 
of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the 
ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or 
abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this part, and notwithstanding any 
judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts 
and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or 
amend it, continue in force.” India Const. art. 31B. 
20 See Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. 
21 Noorani, supra note 12, at 731. Nehru himself commented on the narrow scope of 
laws belonging to the Ninth Schedule, stating, “It is not with any great satisfaction or 
pleasure that we have produced this long schedule. We do not wish to add to it for two 
reasons. One is that the schedule consists of a particular type of legislation [land reform 
laws], generally speaking, and another type should not come in. Secondly, every single 
measure included in this schedule was carefully considered by our president and certified 
by him.” Id. 
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 From the moment of the First Amendment and the introduction 
of land reform laws under the Ninth Schedule, a long saga ensued in 
the courts.22 Between 1951 and 1967, property owners challenged the 
laws and constitutional amendments that placed land reform laws 
within the Ninth Schedule.23 Initially, the laws were challenged as viola-
tions of article 13(2) of the constitution, which provides against deroga-
tion of fundamental rights.24 Analogizing the constitutional amend-
ments to laws, plaintiffs creatively argued in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. 
Union of India 25 and Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan 26 that the amendments 
were abridging the fundamental right to property and therefore were 
invalid under article 13(2).27 Nevertheless, in both decisions, the In-
dian Supreme Court rejected the arguments and “upheld the constitu-
tional validity” of article 31B.28 
 In 1967, however, the supreme court reversed itself and held, by a 
slim six-to-five majority, that the amendments were “laws” within the 
meaning of article 13.29 This was a significant decision, for the court 
ruled for the first time that there were implied limitations on Parlia-
ment’s power to amend the constitution.30 The court held that “Par-
liament would have no power from the date of the decision (February 
27, 1967) to amend any of the provisions of part III so as to take away 
or abridge fundamental rights.”31 The court further noted that, if Par-
liament wished to amend fundamental rights, it would have to convene 
a Constituent Assembly (constitutional convention).32 
 Following this significant decision, the Government continued its 
“radical measures” on the social front, destined once again to clash 
with the courts.33 One goal of the new prime minister, Indira Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, was to eliminate payments the Govern-
ment was required to make to princes.34 In consideration for the 
                                                                                                                      
22 See id. at 731–33. 
23 See id. 
24 India Const. art. 13, § 2. Article 13(2) reads: “The State shall not make any law 
which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contra-
vention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.” Id. 
25 Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, A.I.R. SC 458 (1951) (India). 
26 Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. SC 845 (1965) (India). 
27 Nayak, supra note 17, at 2. 
28 Id. 
29 I C Golak Nath & Ors v. State of Punjab & Anr, 2 S.C.R. 762 (1967) (India). 
30 Nayak, supra note 17, at 3. 
31 Noorani, supra note 12, at 732. 
32 Nayak, supra note 17, at 3. 
33 Id. 
34 Katherine Frank, Indira 323 (2001). 
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peaceful accession of their territories to the Union of India at the 
time of independence from Great Britain, the constitution mandated 
annual payments, known as “privy purses,” to the displaced princes.35 
These payments, however, were unpopular with the populace, and 
Mrs. Gandhi was determined to save to the treasury $6 million per 
annum through the elimination of the privileges. Hence, in Septem-
ber 1970, Gandhi muscled an amendment through the lower house of 
Parliament aimed at “rescind[ing] the privy purses.”36 Although the 
vote passed with significant margins in the lower house, it was de-
feated by one vote in the upper house.37 Following this parliamentary 
defeat of her amendment, Gandhi simply instructed her ally, Presi-
dent V.V. Giri, to “derecognize” the princes through a presidential 
proclamation, unconstitutionally stripping the royalty of their pay-
ments and titles.38 
 The supreme court invalidated the derecognition of the princes as 
unconstitutional (along with a contemporaneously enacted measure 
nationalizing banks) in early December 1970.39 As one commentator 
described it, “[B]y now, it was clear that the Supreme Court and Par-
liament were at loggerheads over the relative position of the fundamen-
tal rights.”40 
 In response to this blow from the supreme court, Mrs. Gandhi dis-
solved Parliament and called for new elections to take place in February 
1971.41 Campaigning on the popularity of her socialist and populist leg-
islation, Mrs. Gandhi’s Congress Party was returned to power with a two-
thirds majority, making her “the most powerful Indian prime minister 
since independence.”42 With this newfound power, the prime minister 
once again eagerly set to amending the constitution.43 Between 1971 
and 1972, Parliament passed a number of important constitutional 
amendments, including, significantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment 
(Parliament has the “absolute power to amend any part of the constitu-
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. The vote in the lower house was 339-154. Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Frank, supra note 34, at 323; Nayak, supra note 17, at 3. 
40 Nayak, supra note 17, at 3. 
41 Frank, supra note 34 at 323–24. 
42 Id. at 327. The new majority in the lower house of Parliament gave the Congress 
Party 325 seats—seventy more seats than in the previous Parliament. Id. 
43 Id. at 328. 
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tion, including Part III dealing with fundamental rights”),44 the Twenty-
sixth Amendment (elimination of the princes’ privy purses),45 and the 
Twenty-ninth Amendment (inserting certain land reform laws from the 
state of Kerala into the Ninth Schedule, thereby placing the laws beyond 
judicial review).46 
 Once again, legislation involving amendment of the constitution 
and land reform laws was challenged in the courts. In what became 
known as the Kesavananda Bharati case,47 a thirteen-judge panel of the 
supreme court issued a seminal opinion spanning nearly 800 pages48 
and an entire volume of the Supreme Court Cases Reporter.49 The 
court adeptly issued a series of instrumental decisions.50 
 First, the court overturned the Golak Nath case, which had held 
that Parliament lacked the power to amend fundamental rights in the 
constitution without a constitutional convention.51 Second, by a margin 
of thirteen-to-zero, the court upheld the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 
which stipulated that the “Parliament had the power to amend any or 
all provisions of the Constitution.”52 Ruling seven-to-six, however, the 
court included one caveat: although no part of the constitution was be-
yond amendment, Parliament could not abrogate the “basic structure” 
of the constitution through simple amendments.53 Additionally, the 
court upheld the Twenty-ninth Amendment, holding the Kerala land 
reform laws were beyond judicial review, as they were contained in the 
Ninth Schedule.54 
 Hence, the court, while upholding the amendments passed by 
Parliament, inserted the power of judicial review for itself by ruling 
that amendments, altering the “basic structure” of the constitution 
could not withstand judicial scrutiny.55 The court also reserved to it-
                                                                                                                      
44 Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971; Frank, supra note 34, at 328; 
Nayak, supra note 17, at 4. 
45 See Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971. 
46 See Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972; Nayak, supra note 17, at 4; 
Noorani, supra note 12, at 732. 
47 His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala & another, 
(1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India). 
48 G.J. Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution?, 4 Int’l J. Con. Law 460, 474 
(2006). 
49 Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225. 
50 See id. 
51 Noorani, supra note 12, at 732. 
52 Nayak, supra note 17, at 4. 
53 Noorani, supra note 12, at 732. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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self the task of determining what exactly constitutes the “basic struc-
ture” of the constitution.56 
 Although the government questioned the basic structure doctrine 
articulated in Kesavananda Bharati, the ruling was re-affirmed in subse-
quent decisions.57 Thus, for over thirty years, Parliament was able to 
operate by amending the constitution so long as it did not erode the 
basic structure of the constitution.58 
B. Background to the Raja Ram Pal Case 
 Indian politicians have long been plagued by allegations of cor-
ruption.59 In 1989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s squeaky-clean image 
was tarnished by allegations that he and a number of government offi-
cials had received kickbacks from a Swedish company named Bofors AB 
to provide India with howitzer guns.60 The “Bofors scandal” led to Mr. 
Gandhi’s defeat in the 1989 elections.61 One of Mr. Gandhi’s successors 
as prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, also faced extensive accusations 
of impropriety.62 Most significantly, in 1993 Mr. Rao survived a no-
confidence vote in Parliament only after he allegedly bribed several 
members of Parliament (MPs) to support him.63 And more recently, 
India’s foreign minister, Natwar Singh, resigned after being implicated 
in Paul Volker’s United Nations investigation of the oil-for-food scandal 
in Iraq.64 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. 
57 See Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp (1) S.C.C. 1 (India) (invali-
dating clauses of Thirty-ninth Amendment as inconsistent with basic structure of constitu-
tion); see also Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 625 (1980) (India) (striking 
down clauses 4 and 5 inserted into article 368 of the constitution by the Forty-second 
Amendment as inconsistent with basic structure doctrine). 
58 See id. 
59 See infra notes 60–67. 
60 See DNA India, Chronology of the Bofors Scandal, http://www.dnaindia.com/report. 
asp?NewsID=1082262 (last visited May 5, 2008). 
61 Rajiv Gandhi Cleared over Bribery, BBC News, Feb. 4, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/south_asia/3458319.stm. In 2004, the Delhi High Court posthumously exonerated 
Mr. Gandhi of any alleged impropriety in the Bofors scandal. Id. 
62 World News Briefs; Former Indian Premier Charged with Corruption, New York Times, 
Sep. 27, 1997, at A6. 
63 Id.; Ex-Indian PM Narasimha Rao Dies, BBC News, Dec. 23, 2004, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4120315.stm. Rao was convicted of corruption in 2000, but the 
verdict was overturned in 2002. Id. 
64 India Minister Quits in Iraq Row, BBC News, Dec. 6, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/south_asia/4502080.stm. 
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 A news team sting operation on December 12, 2005, uncovered an 
even deeper morass of corruption.65 In what came to be known as a 
“cash-for-query” scandal, ten members of the lower house and one 
member of the upper house of Parliament were captured on videotape 
taking bribes in exchange for asking questions in Parliament.66 The 
bribes ranged from $325 to $2400.67 Although politicians had been 
embroiled in corruption scandals before, such blatant dishonesty 
forced the government’s hand, culminating in the expulsion of MPs in 
December of 2005.68 With some of the MPs challenging the expulsion 
as unconstitutional, and claiming they had been entrapped, the scandal 
foreshadowed a constitutional showdown in the supreme court.69 
 Article 105(3) of the Indian Constitution states: “In other respects, 
the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and 
of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may 
from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so de-
fined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees 
immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the constitu-
tion [Forty-fourth Amendment] Act 1978.”70 This section is similar to 
Article I, Section 5, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Each 
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members 
for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel 
a Member.”71 Although the U.S. Constitution expressly outlines a pro-
cedure for the House and Senate to expel members, the Indian Consti-
tution does not explicitly mention expulsion.72 Instead, it could be in-
terpreted as saying Parliament has the power to make laws to regulate 
itself.73 This ambiguity came to light in the Raja Ram Pal case.74 
                                                                                                                      
65 Indian MPs Expelled for Bribes, BBC News, Dec. 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/south_asia/4555388.stm [hereinafter MPs Expelled]. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. The ten Lok Sabha (lower house) members expelled were from a variety of politi-
cal parties, including five members of the BJP, three members of BSP, one from Congress, 
and one from RJD. The Rajya Sabha (upper house) member expelled belonged to BJP. Par-
liament Gets Supreme Stamp, Hindustan Times, Jan. 11, 2007, available at http://www.hindu- 
stantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=6fae6738-e4cf-4e5b-9c08-ebbbc0ea1503. 
69 See MPs Expelled, supra note 65. 
70 India Const. art. 105, § 3. 
71 U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
72 See India Const. art. 105, § 3. 
73 Id. 
74 Raja Ram Pal, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184. 
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 Expulsion from Parliament is not unprecedented.75 The first per-
son to be expelled from Parliament was H.G. Mudgal, in a situation 
remarkably similar to the recent cash-for-query scandal.76 While Mr. 
Mudgal complained he was denied due process, the Speaker of the 
Lower House, G.V. Mavlankar, stated, “The procedure of forming a 
special committee is a proper one and the House can expel any of its 
members,” and the issue was not pursued further.77 
 In the period following the end of the dark days of the Emer-
gency Period, even the legendary Indira Gandhi was herself expelled 
from the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament).78 In December 
1978, Mrs. Gandhi, having recently returned from a well-received trip 
to London, was found guilty by the Privileges Committee of Parlia-
ment for “obstructing four officials who were investigating Maruti 
Limited”79 and “intimidating officials of the Lok Sabha.”80 
 What differentiates the 2005 expulsion of eleven members of Par-
liament from the prior expulsion cases of Mr. Mudgal and Mrs. Gan-
dhi is that neither parliamentarian decided to fight their grievances 
through the courts.81 Hence, when the eleven expelled MPs pursued 
their cases through the judicial process, a case of first impression 
came before the Indian Supreme Court.82 
II. Discussion 
 Two seminal cases came before the Indian Supreme Court in 
2006.83 One, the Coelho case, would decide whether the court could re-
view acts of Parliament within the Ninth Schedule, while the other, the 
Raja Ram Pal case, would pass judgment on whether Parliament’s in-
ternal procedures were justiciable.84 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Frank, supra note 34, at 435; Neeraj Mishra, Face Off, India Today, Oct. 30, 2006, 
at 2. 
76 Mishra, supra note 75, at 2. 
77 Id. 
78 Frank, supra note 34, at 435. 
79 Id. Mrs. Gandhi was not prime minister at the time, having lost the elections she 
called in 1977 after the Emergency. See id. Following her expulsion, Mrs. Gandhi was im-
prisoned under an act of Parliament. She was, however, released after a week and became 
more popular than ever. She eventually returned to power in 1980. See id. at 436. 
80 Mishra, supra note 75, at 2. 
81 See id. 
82 Id. 
83 Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1; Raja Ram Pal, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184. 
84 Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1; Raja Ram Pal, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184. 
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A. Justiciability of the Ninth Schedule 
 The power to put laws out of the reach of the judiciary under arti-
cle 31B led Parliament to enact several laws and place them within the 
Ninth Schedule, which had originally been created by Prime Minister 
Nehru to help protect progressive land reform laws from judicial scru-
tiny.85 The scheme, which originally comprised of thirteen laws in 1951, 
had mushroomed to include 284 laws by 2006, many unrelated to land 
reform or ending feudalism.86 The proliferation of laws included within 
the Ninth Schedule led to much public consternation, and in 2006, the 
constitutional bench of the Indian Supreme Court finally agreed to 
take up a case challenging laws under the grounds that they “could not 
have been validly inserted in the Ninth Schedule.”87 
 On January 11, 2007, Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal handed down 
the case of I.R. Coelho (Dead) By Lrs v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others.88 The 
Chief Justice began by stating the broad question to be considered by 
the court: “[W]hether on and after [April 24, 1973] when [the] basic 
structures doctrine was propounded, it is permissible for the Parlia-
ment under Article 31B to immunize legislations from fundamental 
rights by inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and, if so, what is its 
effect on the power of judicial review of the Court?”89 
 The Chief Justice first traced the development of the law, citing 
the major cases that had been decided by the court with respect to 
interpretation of some articles of the constitution and challenges to 
the Ninth Schedule.90 Thus the court found occasion to focus on the 
Golak Nath case, which had “held that [a] constitutional amendment is 
‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution and, there-
fore, if it takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III there-
of, it is void,”91 and Kesavananda Bharati, which had overruled Golak 
Nath and held that “Article 368 [the amendment clause of the Consti-
tution] did not enable the Parliament to alter the basic structure or 
framework of the Constitution.”92 
                                                                                                                      
85 Noorani, supra note 12, at 731. 
86 India Court Opens Law to Review, BBC News, Jan. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/south_asia/6251067.stm [hereinafter India Court Opens]. 
87 Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, at 69. 
88 Id. at 1. 
89 Id. at 70. 
90 See id. at 69–75. 
91 Id. at 73. 
92 Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, at 74. 
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 Next, the court dove into a discussion on the importance of fun-
damental rights.93 Quoting the Nobel laureate and economist, Dr. 
Amartya Sen, the court noted “the justification for protecting funda-
mental rights is not on the assumption that they are higher rights, but 
that protection is the best way to promote a just and tolerant society.”94 
Furthermore, the court noted that “fundamental rights occupy a 
unique place in the lives of civilized societies and have been described 
. . . as ‘transcendental,’ ‘inalienable’ and ‘primordial.’”95 Moreover, not-
ing the importance of fundamental rights in providing checks and bal-
ances, the court stated: 
[T]he jurisprudence and development around fundamental 
rights has made it clear that they are not limited, narrow 
rights but provide a broad check against the violations or ex-
cesses by the State authorities. The fundamental rights have in 
fact proved to be the most significant constitutional control 
on the Government, particularly legislative power.96 
 Noting the nature of fundamental rights in providing a check 
against actions of Parliament, the court then stated that “separation of 
powers is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.”97 This led 
the court to examine the central question of “whether the basic struc-
ture test would include judicial review of Ninth Schedule laws on the 
touchstone of fundamental rights.”98 
 The court disposed of the question of its ability to conduct judicial 
review of legislation under the Ninth Schedule by stating that it would 
be contrary to the check that article 3299 confers: “It cannot be said that 
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. at 79–80. 
94 Id. at 79. 
95 Id. at 80. 
96 Id. at 82. 
97 Coelho, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 1, at 87. 
98 Id. at 88. 
99 Article 32 provides: 
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part— 
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for 
the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or 
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibi-
tion, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the 
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. 
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by 
clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to 
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the same Constitution that provides for a check on legislative power, 
will decide whether such a check is necessary or not. It would be a ne-
gation of the Constitution.”100 
 Additionally, the court again looked to its previous jurisprudence 
in the Kesavananda Bharati case and pointed out that although “Parlia-
ment has [the] power to amend the provisions of Part III so as to 
abridge or take away fundamental rights . . . that power is subject to the 
limitation of basic structure doctrine,” and “at least some fundamental 
rights do form part of basic structure of the Constitution.”101 The su-
preme court thus held it could strike down any law inserted into the 
Ninth Schedule if it were contrary to the basic structure of the constitu-
tion and passed after the Kesavananda Bharati case was decided.102 
B. The Power to Review Non-legislative Procedure 
 The case of the expelled MPs, Raja Ram Pal v Hon’ble Speaker, Lok 
Sabha & Others, rapidly made its way to the supreme court.103 The case 
was heard by a constitutional bench of five justices of the supreme 
court, including Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal.104 
 Petitioners asserted five significant contentions with respect to the 
unconstitutionality of their expulsions.105 First, petitioners argued that 
India’s Parliament could not expel the MPs because it did not inherit 
such “power and privilege of expulsion” from the British House of 
Commons through the constitution.106 Petitioners argued that 
expulsion is necessarily punitive in nature rather than reme-
dial and such power vested in [the] House of Commons as a 
result of its power to punish for contempt in its capacity as a 
High Court of Parliament and since this Status was not ac-
corded to [the] Indian Legislature, the power to expel could 
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not be claimed by the Houses of Parliament under Article 
105(3).107 
 Second, they stated article 105(3) could not be the basis for ex-
pulsion, as it “would come in conflict with other constitutional provi-
sions,” namely articles 101 and 102, which deal with disqualification of 
members of Parliament.108 Third, they argued there was a “denial of 
principles of natural justice in the [Parliamentary] inquiry proceed-
ings,” which cannot be exempt from judicial review.109 
 The petitioners’ final two arguments involved the scope of judi-
cial review.110 They argued that the supreme court “is the final arbiter 
on the constitutional issues and the existence of judicial power” and 
“that the constitutional and legal protection accorded to the citizens 
would become illusory if it were left to the organ in question to de-
termine the legality of its own action.”111 Furthermore, the expelled 
MPs claimed it is the function of the judiciary to review the “the exer-
cise of power by the executive or any other authority” to ensure its 
compliance with the constitution.112 
 Representatives from the two Houses of Parliament did not appear 
before the court, viewing the matter as a political question and there-
fore not justiciable.113 Their positions, however, were represented by 
the Union of India, which argued “[t]he actions of expulsions are mat-
ters within the inherent power and privileges of the Houses of Parlia-
ment.”114 
 In what can be regarded as a seminal opinion in the annals of In-
dian constitutional law, the supreme court deftly disposed of the peti-
tioners’ arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of their expulsion 
from Parliament while simultaneously upholding the principles of judi-
cial review.115 The court began by stating that the constitution was in 
fact the “supreme lex in this country” and cited the famous Kesavananda 
Bharati case as support for this principle.116 
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 First, the court addressed the petitioners’ claim that because Par-
liament did not inherit the power of expulsion from Britain’s House of 
Commons, it lacked the power to expel them.117 The court began ex-
amining this issue by citing its decision in the 1964 UP Assembly case, 
where it noted that although “[i]n England, Parliament is sovereign,” 
India had a federalist system whereby “the distribution of limited ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial authority among bodies which are coor-
dinate with and independent of each other,” and therefore the charac-
teristics of the (unwritten) British Constitution could not be compared 
to that of the Indian Constitution.118 
 To establish whether other constitutional provisions dealing with 
the disqualification of MPs clashed with a power to expel alleged in 
article 105(3), the court looked to the specific meaning of the words 
“vacancy,” “disqualification,” and “expulsion.”119 Article 101 specifi-
cally deals with vacancies; article 102 with disqualification for mem-
bership.120 The court held these provisions all served different pur-
poses: “While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-
election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there 
is no bar on re-election. As far as the term ‘vacancy’ is concerned, it is 
a consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold 
membership.”121 Hence, the court ruled the power of expulsion did 
not conflict with any other constitutional provisions.122 
 Based on this analysis, the majority stated it was unable to find any 
reasons why Parliament “should be denied the claim to the power of 
expulsion arising out of remedial power of contempt.”123 Furthermore, 
in his concurring opinion, Justice Thakker cited an Australian case for 
support of the principle that Parliament also possessed the power to 
expel a member because “the need for removal and replacement of a 
dishonest member may be . . . imperative as a matter of self-
preservation.”124 
 In tackling the petitioners’ final three contentions, the court 
made certain to address the relationship between the co-equal 
branches of government and, simultaneously, discussed how it had 
                                                                                                                      
117 Id. at 249–51. 
118 Id. at 246–47. 
119 Id. at 284. 
120 Id. 
121 Raja Ram Pal, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 184, at 284. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 323. 
124 Id. at 403 (Thakker, J., concurring) (citing Armstrong v. Budd, (1969) 71 S.R. 386 
(NSW) (Austl.)). 
2008] India’s New Constitutionalism 271 
jurisdiction in this case.125 To this extent it stated, “Parliament is a co-
ordinate organ and its views do deserve deference even while its acts 
are amenable to judicial scrutiny . . . mere co-ordinate constitutional 
status . . . does not disentitle this Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
of judicial review.”126 
 Having dispatched the question of whether it had jurisdiction, 
the court then examined the scope of its jurisdiction.127 Significantly, 
the court departed with the established jurisprudence of English 
courts. In particular, the court held that although the British House 
of Commons had a “broad doctrine of exclusive cognizance” of its 
internal proceedings,128 this principle was displaced in India by arti-
cles 122(1) and 212(1) of the constitution.129 Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that although it may not question the “truth or cor-
rectness of the material . . . [nor] substitute its opinion for that of the 
legislature,” proceedings of Parliament “which may be tainted on ac-
count of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality” could 
still be reviewed by the judiciary.130 
III. Analysis 
 The two recent decisions of the Indian Supreme Court, in Coelho 
and Raja Ram Pal, can be heralded as significant victories for Indian 
constitutional law and democratic government.131 The court’s decisions 
were seminal because they re-evaluated the conduct of Parliament and 
the scope of judicial review in which the court could engage with re-
spect to Parliament’s legislative and non-legislative functions.132 
 The Coelho case held that laws and constitutional amendments that 
altered the basic structure of the constitution, by violating fundamental 
rights, could be invalidated.133 This decision is significant for a variety 
of reasons.134 
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 First, the unanimous opinion in Coelho can be viewed as a victory 
for fundamental rights.135 Given the prior action of Parliament in 
dumping hundreds of laws into the Ninth Schedule, it was unclear 
whether the fundamental rights advanced by the constitution would be 
subject to simple amendment or dissolution by Parliament.136 In light 
of the court’s decision, however, it is now clear that rights such as 
“equality,” “freedom,” and “life” are considered “fundamental” and 
therefore “are not bamboos that will bend to accommodate passing po-
litical winds.”137 
 Related to the first point is the concept of political accountabil-
ity.138 In the past, politicians have been tempted to abuse the structure 
of article 31B and the Ninth Schedule to include laws unrelated to 
land reform or ending feudalism as a means of scoring political points 
with constituents; they will now no longer be able to evade the scru-
tiny of a watchful judiciary.139 
 Third, this decision restores a balance of power between the leg-
islative and judicial branches.140 At the core of any democracy is an 
independent, thriving judiciary.141 Part-and-parcel of such a system is 
the ability of courts to engage in judicial review and strike down laws 
that do not conform with the basic charter of governmental power.142 
By ruling that the court could strike down any law that altered the ba-
sic structure of the constitution, the court defended the constitution 
and placed an essential check on Parliament.143 
 At the same time, the Coelho opinion cannot be viewed as only 
having a positive impact.144 It has opened the court to considerable 
avenues of criticism.145 For example, one could argue the decision 
gives the judiciary an inordinate amount of power, countering the 
“restoring balance” argument offered above.146 The case could be 
                                                                                                                      
135 See Harish Salve, Citizen Supreme, India Today, Jan. 29, 2007, at 2. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Subhash Kashyap, Ninth Schedule Can’t Help, Trib. (India), Jan. 29, 2007, available 
at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070129/edit.htm#4. 
139 See id. 
140 See India Court Opens, supra note 86. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See Back to the Drawing Board, Hindustan Times, Jan. 17, 2007, available at http://www. 
hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=1f34bd2e-fb9b-4e97-adc0-93263e67e0 
b7. 
145 See id. 
146 See Jaising, supra note 133. 
2008] India’s New Constitutionalism 273 
made that the supreme court has gone too far and established itself as 
the most powerful branch of government, as it has essentially given 
itself the power to be the “final arbiter of what is in the public inter-
est.”147 In fact, one commentator stated that Coelho makes the “Su-
preme Court one of the most powerful courts in the world.”148 
 In a sense, the decision could also be criticized as allowing an un-
elected judiciary to usurp and negate the power of the people instilled 
in their elected representatives.149 Although this argument about judi-
cial activism is nothing new to India, this decision is likely to feed more 
pronounced attacks on the court, perhaps jeopardizing its credibility.150 
 Additionally, the claim could be made that, given this newfound 
power the judiciary could enact its own agenda.151 Indira Jaising, a 
practicing attorney before the supreme court, has already warned that 
“[w]e live in times when the Supreme Court believes that liberalisa-
tion, privatisation and globalisation are good for the country and any 
law that hinders these will violate fundamental rights and hence, the 
basic features of the Constitution.”152 
 As explained in Part I, the power to expel MPs had never before 
been challenged in a court.153 Therefore, in accepting and settling 
the Raja Ram Pal case, the Indian Supreme Court issued a seminal 
opinion reinforcing the power of Parliament to expel its members 
under its “privileges and immunities” power as set forth by article 
105(3) of the constitution.154 Thus, similar to the decision in Coelho, 
the decision in Raja Ram Pal is also controversial for its implica-
tions.155 
 First, it can be argued the decision was necessary to clarify a con-
tentious point of law.156 Similar to the manner in which the U.S. Su-
preme Court resolves disputes between circuit courts of appeal, here, 
the Indian Supreme Court cleared up confusion between divided 
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high courts.157 Regardless of the outcome of the case, there is now an 
element of finality to a previously open question of law.158 
 A second argument in favor of Raja Ram Pal follows the argument 
from proponents of the Coelho decision, which is that the opinion 
holds politicians accountable for their actions.159 No longer can they 
exercise decisions regarding membership and hope to hide behind 
the cloak of parliamentary immunity.160 And furthermore, it is clear 
the public is behind the judiciary, which is viewed by many as the “last 
post of hope” in a very corrupt country.161 
 Of course, this interpretation is subject to challenge by the view 
that the decision has negative implications in terms of strengthening 
both the power of Parliament and the judiciary.162 Parliament’s powers 
have been vastly expanded (or “clarified”) such that it may expel mem-
bers at will, as it has the power to determine its own procedures accord-
ing to the court’s interpretation of article 105(3).163 The court limited 
this power by noting that “proceedings which may be tainted on ac-
count of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality are not 
protected from judicial scrutiny.”164 In other words, the court granted 
itself expanded power of judicial review over parliamentary expul-
sion.165 One could, however, still imagine politically motivated ejec-
tions.166 As one commentator wrote, “[A] majoritarian government 
could well use brute strength and terminate memberships” of the po-
litical opposition.167 
 The strongest implication of the Raja Ram Pal case is that the court 
will now be able to exercise scrutiny over non-legislative proceedings, 
not just those proceedings dealing with parliamentary expulsion.168 
Because the court did not limit its language to proceedings dealing 
with expulsions, but rather noted it could review proceedings tainted 
with “substantive or gross illegality,” it leaves open the floodgates to 
challenges of parliamentary procedure.169 This, no doubt, will be a 
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source of contention between Parliament and the court in the fu-
ture.170 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court of India is clearly more assertive today than it 
was just thirty years ago, when it held in the Kesavananda Bharati case 
that it had limited ability to conduct judicial review of laws placed in 
the infamous Ninth Schedule, thus shielding them from review. Recent 
decisions in the Coelho and Raja Ram Pal cases show the court is more 
willing to undertake judicial review, by permitting examination of both 
Parliament’s legislative and non-legislative roles. Such action has al-
lowed the court to tackle issues ranging from invalidating laws that have 
nothing to do with land reform, to stemming political corruption. The 
court’s decisions are not without controversy, as various sides see them 
as expanding accountability, and others see them as usurping the role 
of the legislature. Given the seminal nature of these Indian Supreme 
Court decisions, however, the cases are likely to have a lasting impact 
on not only Indian constitutional law, but also the way Parliament crafts 
laws and constitutional amendments in the future. 
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